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January the army moved up to the Sutlej. It deployed with its
left at Ferozepore, its centre opposite the village of Sobraon
where the Sikhs had constructed a bridge of boats and were strongly
entrenched on the south bank, and its right at Dharamcote 20 miles
away where Sir Harry Smith’s division was based. He had
privately criticised the Commander-in-Chief for resorting to brave
but impetuous tactics which had caused unnecessarily heavy casualties.
He had maintained that objectives could be more economically achieved
by manoeuvre. His ideas were shortly to be put to the test.
On 17th January Sir Harry was ordered to move to support the garrison
at Ludhiana 50 miles further east after word was received that
the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej in strength in that area, and
to prevent them intercepting the enormous battery gun train, ammunition,
stores and treasure, covering ten miles of road, which was slowly
approaching from the south. He set off immediately with an infantry
brigade, comprising the 31st Regiment and two Indian battalions,
a brigade of cavalry and 18 guns. At Jagraon, about halfway, he
was joined by HM 53rd Foot. He left all but his baggage wagons
there, retaining only what could be carried on camels, and pressed
on. Seven miles south west of Ludhiana he found his direct approach
blocked by the enemy. He decided to bypass the Sikhs using his
cavalry and artillery to prevent them engaging his marching troops
and baggage. At one stage he was forced to form line against them
which required a complicated counter march on the centre by regiments,
the focal point being the 31st Regiment, which was carried out
with great steadiness and so impressed the Sikhs that they did
not attack. The Times of 25th March 1846 said “The judgement
and caution of General Smith in avoiding battle on this occasion
must be advantageously contrasted with the headlong and indiscriminating
valour which carried our troops into the frightful conflicts of
Moodkee and Ferozeshah”.
Moving on, he was reinforced by a second infantry brigade. He
next located the Sikhs encamped about the village of Aliwal where
they were busy improving a curved line of emplacements of banks
of earth to protect their guns. His initial frontal attack drew
heavy enemy fire which enabled him to identify their positions
more accurately. In his subsequent report he wrote that “I
ascertained that by bringing up my right and carrying the village
of Aliwal I could with great effect precipitate myself upon his
left and centre”. He therefore moved up his right rear brigade.
In his report he said “Her Majesty’s 31st Foot and
the native regiments contending for the front the battle became
general ...... the brigade made a rapid and noble charge and carried
the village and two guns of large calibre.” The Sikh left
front was turned. Their infantry, massed in reserve in their camp,
were exposed to intense artillery fire, the onslaught of the British
cavalry and the remorseless advance of the infantry. Their right
was slowly forced back, and eventually the Sikh resistance broke
and they retreated back to the Sutlej abandoning their guns and
stores. Their casualties were severe, they admitted to 3,000 dead.
The British loss was relatively light, 598 killed and wounded
in all, and the 31st Regiment’s astonishingly no more than
16. Sir Harry had detected the enemy’s weak point and concentrated
his attacks against it.
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